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Professor of the Department of Classical Philology, University of Latvia Discussion of rhetoric is a common subject in Greek and Roman culture. Roman rhetoric developed when Greek rhetoric and oratory had flourished for some centuries. Chronological succession and discussion of the same subject matter in the framework of general influence of Greek ideas and practices on Roman culture suggest impact, possible reception and adoption of ideas in this field of research.
Study of the impact of ideas is bound to encounter reasonable difficulties. As so much of the ancient literary heritage is lost, oftentimes it is impossible to establish direct interconnection between the originator of the idea and its receptor. Conclusions may be subjective, although the link seems obvious.
Knowledge of ideas in most cases is impossible without availability of the text. Thus text tradition is essential for establishing interconnectedness and continuity of ideas in a culture.
Understanding of the impact of the major source of ancient rhetoric, Aristotle's On Rhetoric on Roman rhetorical culture starts with establishing availability of the text as a precondition for knowledge of the ideas. Two types of ancient sources provide information on this issue: These sources speak about the ge neral history of Aristotle's esoteric writings. Rhetoric is not mentioned specifically. Still, as the Rhetoric is one of the esoteric texts, as there is no evidence that its text history is different from other esoteric texts and as there is no reason to suspect a different text history, for the purpose of the study of text reception the testimony of ancient sources pertaining to the esoteric texts is applied to the Rhetoric. Strabo points out that the loss of Aristotelian texts was destructive for the Lycaeum. Only some of Aristotle's exoteric writings had survived. Aristotelian tradition of rhetoric gradually subsided. Thus the Peripatetics were unable to philosophize according to the principles of the system and primarily engaged in dialectical debate on general issues. Quintilian argues that this was some sort of rhetorical exercise (Quintiliani Institutio oratoria 12.2.25). In the second century BC all the philosophical schools show a reaction against rhetoric (Ciceronis De oratore 1.46-47). Quintilian mentions Critolaus, a second century BC head of the Peripatetic school who denied that rhetoric was a faculty (vis), science (scientia) or art (ars) and considered it to be merely a skill (usus), and a certain Athenaeus 4 who called rhetoric the art of deceit (ars fallendi) (Quintiliani Institutio oratoria 2.15.23). With the publication of Aristotelian writings in the first century BC the Peripatetics resumed interest in Aristotle's theories. One of them, name unknown, even argued that Demosthenes had learned the art of oratory from Aristotle's On Rhetoric 5 . Strabo points out that with Aristotelian texts available, the Peripatetics propounded the doctrine of Aristotle more successfully than their predecessors, but had to treat many issues only as probabilities as the available copies of the texts abounded in mistakes.
More fortunate was the fate of Aristotelian writings in Asia Minor.
The most dramatic phase was when after Neleus' death the texts were inherited by his descendants, uneducated individuals who hid the books under the ground in order to save the collection from being seized for the needs of the Pergamon library. Eventually the texts were sold to a certain Apellicon, a book collector from Athens. This individual, more a book lover than a philosopher, made an attempt to restore the damaged manuscripts, but the restoration, text correctnesswise, was of low quality. After the capture of Athens Apellicon's book collection was seized by Sulla and transported to Rome (after 86 BC) -Strabo and Plutarch agree on this. In Rome Apellicon's collection was "arranged" by the grammarian Tyrannion, 11 These references are expressed by a particiThese references are expressed by a participant in the discussion. Thus a question arises whether the speaker pronounces Cicero's views. The answer is provided by another letter in which Cicero states that Aris totle expresses his ideas through the speeches of the discussion participants (Ad Atticum 13.19). As Cicero himself has remarked on the closeness of On the Orator to Aristotle's dialogues, presentation of a theme in On the Orator is Cicero's own viewpoint. So the words of Antonius, the protagonist of the second book (De oratore 2.160), that he does not deviate far from Aristotle in fact refer to Cicero himself.
in arranging his own library in Antium (Ad Atticum 4.8). More specific, unquestionable information regarding Cicero's knowledge of Aristotelian writings appears in a letter addressed to Lentulus Spinther (Ad Familiares 1.9.) Cicero argues that he has written On the Orator in the "Aristotelian manner" (Aristotelio more). Certainly Cicero with the "Aristotelian manner" does not mean Aristotle's On Rhetoric, as this text is a discussion in the form of a narrative, while Cicero's relevant text is a dialogue. In On the Orator Cicero characterizes "Aristotelian manner" as presentation of the views of a dialogue participants in the form of a substantiated exposition, so he obviously considers his treatise to be similar in form to the lost Aristo telian philosophical dialogues.
Cicero follows Aristotelian tradition in the discussion of invention (2.114-306), and especially -in characterizing the three objectives of the speaker. Both Aristotle and Cicero agree that the objective of the speaker is persuasion of the audience. Aristotle indicates the applicable non-rhetorical means of persuasion -those that exist objectively -and rhetorical means of persuasion -those that the speaker has to find or arouse. He divides the rhetorical means of persuasion into three groups: arguments (logos), moral characteristics of the speaker (ethos) and attitude of the audience (pathos) (Ars rhetorica 1.2). Cicero for his speaker defines three objectives: to prove (probare), to conciliate (conciliare) and to sway to emotion (movere) (De oratore 2.115, 121, 128). For Cicero proving requires the use of Aristotle's objective proofs and arguments, conciliating echoes Aristotle's moral characteristics of the speaker and swaying to emotion -Aristotle's attitude of the audience.
Cicero's and Aristotle's systems are basically uniform, but the content of the system components is different. These differences are significant enough and show that in different cultures an absolutely uniform system is impossible.
In discussing the function of proving, Cicero more than Aristotle focuses on the objectively existing proofs. He supplements the five Aristotelian non-rhetorical proofs with different legislative norms and various types of contracts (De oratore 2.100, 116). This is due to the fact that in comparison with Athens of Aristotle's times, Roman system of civil law was much more developed. Contrariwise Roman culture was not concerned with the elaborate Aristotelian discussion of argument from the perspective of logics (Ars rhetorica 2.23-25), thus Cicero adopts only a small part of it -the idea of topics suitable for multiple cases of argumentation (loci) (De oratore 2.163-173).
Although the Ciceronian idea of conciliating the audience interacts with the Aristotelian concept of ethos, the moral characteristics of the speaker which create a favourable impression on the audience, Cicero's perspective is different. Aristotle has a mental picture of a speaker in a public assembly or at a court of justice who represents his own interests and strives to create a good impression of himself. Cicero's speaker is an advocate, and for him it is essential to project a likeable image not only of himself, but also of his client (De oratore 2.182-185), as both of them by conciliating the audience promote persuasion. Therefore for Cicero the Aristotelian idea of ethos ap-plies also to the client, although the focus of his discussion is on the speaker.
The Ciceronian idea of a prepossessing speaker is somewhat different from that of Aristotle. Aristotle outlines those projected qualities of the speaker that will conciliate the audience -reason (phronesis), virtue (arete) and benevolence (eunoia) (Ars rhetorica 2.1.). Cicero argues that the speaker should create the impression of himself as being a decent (probus), virtuous (bene moratus) and a good (bonus) person (De oratore 184).
The different projected qualities required for a prepossessing speaker are entailed by the different target audiences of the Aristotelian and Ciceronian speakers. Cicero's and Aristotle's texts offer enough evidence that in Athens and in Rome the speaker addressed different target audiences. In Athens the target audience were several thousands of people from different social ranks, and the speaker in his image projected compliance to common values -reason, virtue and benevolence. Therefore Aristotle stresses that the speaker must know how to speak with different people, and he characterizes types of individuals in accordance with their age, social rank, wealth and power (Ars rhetorica 2.12-17). Cicero does not delve into such a discussion. In Rome, although the audience could be quite heterogeneous, the real target audience were decision makers, and the speaker addressed homogenous audience, a comparatively small group of social elite. As the speaker habitually belonged to this social group, his reason and benevolence were a matter of course and he could concentrate on his self-image of vir bonus 12 .
The differing target audiences of Aristotle and Cicero in order to be swayed to emotion require different approaches. As Aristotle's audience is heterogeneous, arousal of the desired attitude is difficult. The speaker must have knowledge of emotions, as well as possess skills of creating and placating them. Therefore Aristotle provides detailed discussion of nine types of emotions (Ars rhetorica 2.2-11). Cicero looks at emotions from the viewpoint of an advocate. The advocate must perceive the attitude of the decision makers -whether they are benevolent or their benevolence has to be gained. Detailed discussion of emotions is not pertinent (De oratore 2.206).
Significantly enough, Aristotelian influence in the rhetorical handbooks of the Roman imperial period covers persuasion of the audience. The Anonymous Seguerianus 13 , probably an epitome of a second century text, and the rhetorical handbook of Valerius Apsines, a third century sophist in Athens, follow the Aristotelian approach to means of persuasion, dividing them into non-rhetorical and rhetorical, the latter being divided into logos, ethos and pathos 14 .
Thus circulation of the "arranged" Apellicon's book collection in Rome from the first century onward ensured availability of Aristotelian writings in Rome. References to Aristotle's On Rhetoric and to Aristotle's rhetorical ideas bear witness to this fact. Aristotelian doctrine of three types of oratory -deliberative, judicial and epideicticand the theory of means of persuasion was 13 The text is named for Seguier de St. Brisson who in 1843 discovered it in a Paris manuscript.
14 Rhetores Graeci, ed. E. Spengel, Leipzig: Teubner, 1853, 427-460, 331-414. generally accepted. Otherwise the influence of Aristotelian ideas on Roman rhetorical culture was insignificant 15 .
This apparent incongruity -availability and knowledge of Aristotle's On Rhetoric and its slight impact on Roman rhetoric can be explained by the non-compliance of Aristotle's text to the orientation of Roman rhetorical culture. Roman rhetoric was mainly concerned with two areas of research which had originated after Aristotle -stasis theory, a systematic way to determine the central question in a speech, and studies of tropes and figures of speech.
Stasis theory was developed by Hermagoras of Temnos in the second century BC 16 . In the Rhetoric for Herennius and Cicero's On Invention the discussion of invention is based on stasis theory. Stasis remained a major issue of study in the rhetorical writings of the Roman imperial period (Quintilian, Hermogenes). As to Aristotle, he had outlined the issue of stasis in judicial speeches (1.13.9-10; 3.17.1), acknowledging the necessity of establishing the question at issue, but did not discuss the ways and means of doing it. Thus from the perspective of a substantial aspect of Roman rhetoric Aristotle's text was of no interest.
Tropes and figures of speech were the other major area of Roman rhetorical studies. Beginnings of research in this field are obscure, but ancient testimony suggests Stoics' grammar studies in the second cen- (8, 9) . Ornamentation of style was explicated also in the Greek treatises of the Roman imperial period -the most significant being Ps. Longinus' On Sublimity and Hermoges' On Types of Style. As to Aristotle, although he discusses style in the On Rhetoric, he does not do this in the terms of figures of speech and tropes, but for a brief outline of metaphor. Already the first century BC Roman rhetorical tradition would consider it inadequate.
Other major themes of Roman rhetorical theory were delivery (Quintiliani Institutio oratoria 11), memory (Rhetorica ad Herennium 3.28-40) and arrangement of the speech (Rhetorica ad Herennium 3.16-18). Aristotle's text in this respect also was of little interest. In Aristotle's On Rhetoric delivery is mentioned but not discussed (3.1-7), arrangement of the speech is brief and inconsequential (3.13, 3.14, 3.16-19) , memory is not mentioned at all.
Thus, although Aristotle's On Rhetoric was available in Rome since the middle of the first century BC, it did not influence Roman rhetoric much. Second century BC developments of rhetoric made Aristotle's On Rhetoric an obsolete text. It could stimulate but academic interest. Besides Roman rhetoric more than the Greek counterpart was didactic and oriented to practical application. The author would try to present and explain the available means and the correct application of rhetorical "tools" which would ensure successful oratorical activity. Aristotle's text would seem too much concerned with logics, not suitable for instruction and providing insufficient practical advice.
